

**Winning the Firefight is not Enough:
The Need for a Multidimensional Approach
To Stability Operations**

**A Monograph
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Abstract

This monograph establishes a theoretical foundation for stability operations doctrine. It defines a tactical approach to 'limited warfare', applicable across a wide range of stability scenarios, with the hope that the reader will gain a higher level of understanding of these complex types of missions.

Planning and executing stability operations is somewhat problematic, given the US Army's almost exclusive doctrinal focus on conventional operations since the introduction of Active Defense in 1976. Efforts are being made to correct this. Recent drafts of FM 100-5 *Operations*, FM 100-22 *Stability Operations* and FM 100-40 *Offensive and Defensive Tactics*, address the Army's role in stability operations, and elevate the importance of these operations in relation to offensive and defensive combat missions. This monograph attempts to contribute to the current discussion concerning stability operations doctrine.

The monograph uses documentary evidence to present a general theory of limited war, putting into context the various types of military interventions that are classified as stability operations. It uses contemporary ideas of 'chaos' and 'complexity' to define the environment into which stability forces deploy.

In order to overcome the complexities inherent in modern social conflict, the monograph suggests adherence to three general principles. These are derived from a synthesis of Clausewitzian concepts, counter-revolutionary theories and general systems theory. The first principle is that the people remain the most important element in a conflict, the operational center of gravity for all sides. The second principle holds that Intelligence is critical to seizing and maintaining the initiative. The third principle is that there must be a low-level integration of military combat and non-combat, and civilian and information operations under one common operational concept.

Primary and secondary source evidence of the US Army's pacification of the Philippines 1898-1902 is examined in order to illustrate that these three principles are enduring, being manifest on stability operations one hundred years ago.

Incorporating the three enduring principles, a generic 'mental model' is presented in Section IV. The model loosely employs the terms and design of operational level campaign planning, but is meant for use by company, battalion and brigade-level units on stability operations. A 'systems approach' to tactical problem solving, vice the more traditional linear approach, is incorporated into the model. The implications of this systems approach on command functions, on organization and on tactics are discussed. The principle conclusion is that success on stability operations is possible only by employing a multidimensional problem-solving method, requiring great versatility within the stability force military units – particularly at lower levels of command. Mental and functional versatility is vital.

The principles and model presented in the monograph together establish a theoretical foundation for a stability operations doctrine, and raise the level of cognitive understanding needed to operate in these complex situations.

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I. Introduction

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.¹

Carl von Clausewitz

This monograph examines 'the kind of war' that soldiers find themselves in when deployed on a 'stability operation', with the hope that the US Army will not mistake it for something that it is not. In a broader sense the monograph defines how to integrate military forces into a wider political strategy for the resolution of 'social conflict', in operations other than war.²

The thesis presented here is that social conflict is so inherently complex that only a multidimensional or 'systems approach' can bring resolution. Such an integral approach requires a distinct level of cognition by brigade, battalion and company commanders about how to best facilitate the planning and execution of joint military and civilian agency operations.³ These commanders translate abstract policy aims into joint tactical tasks, a function that in conventional operations occurs at higher levels. The ability to perform this function requires a common understanding of stability operations, based upon sound doctrine. Currently there is no comprehensive doctrine for such operations.

It is the main purpose of this monograph to establish a theoretical foundation for stability operations doctrine. This section outlines the strategic context within which stability operations occur, and describes the complex environment into which stability forces may be deployed. Section II presents three enduring principles for stability operations, formulated from a synthesis of modern 'systems theory', counter-revolutionary warfare theory, and traditional Clausewitzian notions of war. Section III examines these principles in the context of the US Army's first international stability operation, the pacification of the Philippines 1898-1902. Using the principles, Section IV develops an

operational concept for stability operations, presenting the concept as a generic 'mental model'.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the reasons why the United States might deploy military forces to resolve non-US social conflicts. We proceed with the important assumption that there will continue to be legitimate situations where the strategic or moral imperatives warrant such deployments, unattractive as they may seem.

Legitimacy and Context

Stability operations draw legitimacy from Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code, and from Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*. These documents authorize the use of the military as an instrument of power in "supporting the national policies" and in "implementing the national objectives". Stability operation deployments deemed necessary for the achievement of national policy objectives are explicitly sanctioned in these particular components of US law. Such deployments are anticipated in the *National Security Strategy*, and in the *National Military Strategy*.⁴

In the context of US military doctrine, stability operations are referred to in Joint Publication 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, and in recent drafts of FM 100-5 *Operations*, FM 100-40 *Offensive and Defensive Tactics*, and in FM 100-22 *Stability Operations*.⁵ This last reference states that stability operations are conducted to promote and sustain regional and global security, and it breaks stability operations down into the following categories; arms control, counter-terrorism, counter-drugs, national assistance, peace actions (including peace keeping and peace enforcement), demonstrations of force, and counter-insurgency operations. Three of these categories are distinguishable for the lack of operational theory governing their conduct: they are; peacekeeping, peace enforcement and counter-insurgency actions - those operations where significant numbers of 'conventional' soldiers 'fight' in the midst of a friendly, neutral

or potentially hostile population. This monograph attempts to link these three types of operations under a common operational theory that is applicable regardless of strategic context. The terms 'limited operations' and stability operations are used interchangeably to describe this type of large-scale operation.

Limited War and Limited (Stability) Operations

From the perspective of the US Army, stability operations involve 'limited warfare'. Operations may be limited by the size or geographic isolation of the objective area, precluding the utilization of, or need for, all of the nation's sources of power. Operations may also be limited by the comparative unimportance of the object,⁶ thus reducing the moral compulsion of the United States to become heavily engaged.

Limited operations are distinguishable from 'general war'. General war exists when the fighting between nation states has the potential to become 'total' in character.⁷ Opposing states generate their strength from distinct 'centers of gravity', and warfare is characterized by a clash of wills between two or more peoples, armies and governments with the aim of destroying or neutralizing the opponent's center of gravity.⁸ Fighting is the means to this end. In general war the political aims govern military planning at strategic level, and sometimes at operational levels; and it is possible to have high intensity interstate war constrained by policy - not absolute in character - thus avoiding the use of weapons of mass destruction (e.g.: The Gulf War 1991). However, in most such wars, the fighting at the tactical level is unobstructed by political restraint, the belief being that military action will be decisive in destroying the enemy's center of gravity.⁹

These large-scale general wars are beyond the scope of this monograph. Examined here are conflicts that occur outside of the dimensions of - or on the peripheries of - inter-state war, or as post-war operations. These are conflicts wherein all participants draw their strength and freedom of action from the same center of gravity - the people of the disputed area. Such conflicts are centripetal, the population forming the hub around

which conflict moves. By necessity, in such conflicts the restraints on the use of force are massive,¹⁰ and military actions are disciplined by political context *at all levels*. Planning and execution at the strategic, the operational and the tactical levels are bound by political restrictions. This is important, for it lowers the threshold at which policy is translated into action, requiring a distinct cognizance in lower ranking officers. Decisive military action is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve under the restrictive constraints of policy.

Success

Success is measured differently in limited operations. They aim to bring stability and security to conflict-threatened or ravaged areas. Intervening military forces pacify warring factions, disarm peoples and build reconciliation. Success is possible only when the majority of people become committed to resolving conflict through peaceful means. The effectiveness of stability operations can be measured using two criteria; how well the operations deter or prevent further violent conflict; and how much they facilitate long term resolution.¹¹ These criteria are hard to measure, and are seldom the result of a decisive action by military forces. The lack of a specific and universal definition of success – achievable by military means – may explain why such operations are unpopular in western military culture.¹²

A doctrine for stability operations must accommodate the restrictions placed upon military action by policy, and the lack of operational decisiveness. Therefore, it should also appreciate a more broadminded approach to mission accomplishment. Doctrine needs to recognize the importance of non-combat dimensions – particularly of civil affairs and information operations – and the role of non-military agencies in effecting conflict resolution. Success comes when one integrates these joint assets into a campaign that has a series of intermediate goals which, if achieved, ultimately lead to a self-sustaining peace between the former hostile factions. Success is gained in increments, over a long duration. Acceptance of this multidimensional and long-term approach to 'victory' is pre-

requisite to understanding how to win in stability operations, particularly in highly complex modern social conflicts.

The Environment

Another imperative to understanding stability operations is to recognize the complex nature of the environment. Complexity is a result of two emerging phenomena. The first is 'globalization' - the forming of a truly global culture. The second is increased heterogeneity – the balkanization of nations and regions along tribal, ethnic or religious lines. Both phenomena cause social polarization outside of the traditional dimensions of the nation state, and add an element of tremendous complexity to conflict.

Globalization involves a blending of local traditional realities with a new worldwide 'corporateness' that is increasingly urbanized, technologically based, and that uses common commercial practices. Around the world, greater numbers of suburban people are employing advanced communication technologies to share ideas and to move goods. Accessibility to communications technology is 'democratizing' finance and commerce, integrating markets and allowing individuals to buy and sell in distant countries with ease.¹³ Global connectivity is also promoting political democratization, the Internet providing once isolated peoples with information about political options, and increasing the demand for universal human rights. There is emerging a shared global awareness about matters of commerce, environmental issues and civil rights. This is manifest in the growth of world wide networks of interest groups who ensure that destabilization at a local level has impact the world over.

While globalization connects the world in intricate and open commercial and political systems, increased heterogeneity divides the world into camps. Tribal, ethnic and religious identifications are strengthening in the world's poorer communities, resulting in significant inter-entity clashes. Increased heterogeneity or 'tribalism' has been considered

a harbinger for the end of nation states and nation state warfare. A number of prominent historians and futurist authors have championed this notion.

Martin Van Creveld, in his *Transformation of War*, believes this to be an era of 'non-political' warfare akin to that of the Middle Ages. Entities other than 'states' caused war.¹⁴ He expects the disintegration of the nation state, and regression into violent realms, wherein groups other than military and police forces gain monopoly over organized violence.¹⁵ Terrorist, bandit, guerrilla, and Mafioso organizations now seek power via paramilitary means.¹⁶ War, as a legitimate event and as a political alternative, is less distinguishable from crime, and not regulated by policy.

Samuel Huntington's views support those of Van Creveld.¹⁷ In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington foresees the inevitable decline of the nation state. He sees the 'emerging anarchy' as most evident and dangerous on the 'fault lines' of civilizations, where differences between cultures, religions, and tribal or ethnic makeup are accentuated. Huntington sees the world in the following way:

Much evidence exists in the 1990s for the relevance of the "sheer chaos" paradigm of world affairs: a global breakdown of law and order, failed states and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world, a global crime wave, transnational Mafia and drug cartels, increasing drug addiction in many societies, a general weakening of the family, a decline in trust and social solidarity in many countries, ethnic, religious and civilization violence and rule by the gun prevalent in much of the world.¹⁸

Robert D. Kaplan's observations are similar.¹⁹ Nation states and traditional interstate borders are eroding. There is growing anarchy - exacerbated by spreading disease, overpopulation in urban centres, scarcity of resources, continued refugee crises and the empowerment of private armies by criminal factions. There is also a diluting of the traditional moral fabric of humanity, once held in the reservoir of small-town and rural community life, with the mass exodus of people to suburban environments where cultural distinctions and traditions are replaced with common economic pressures and

expectations. The inability of governments to accommodate this phenomenon has led to a weakening of national power, and to social conflicts that ignore borders.²⁰

The heterogeneity observed by Van Creveld, Huntington and Kaplan often leads to unrestrained social conflict, destabilizing areas at a time when globalization demands greater stability, and putting pressure upon developed nations to intervene and resolve the internal problems of 'failed states'.²¹ Intervention by US forces into such environments can be chaotic and confusing for military commanders at all levels, and problem solving is a difficult endeavor.²² It requires that military commanders first appreciate that, despite the pessimism presented by the writers above, the world is not about to shatter into a multitude of ex-nation states thrown into anarchy. The established nation states are more durable than these authors imply.²³ And in failed states there is self-organization occurring around tribal, ethnic, or criminal leaders; creating new political, commercial, social, religious, ethnic, or criminal 'systems'. Modern communications and high-speed travel work to connect these new systems to others worldwide. Even within the most violent areas, socio-political entities are emerging and connecting with the larger world. Globalization and heterogeneity will not cancel each other out, but grow, making the world more complex than ever, and making the job of the soldier harder.

Section II proposes a theory for the application of military and non-military force in the resolution of complex social conflicts. It attempts to reduce the impact of complexity by introducing an operational concept that connects 'general systems theory' to traditional military notions of limited warfare. The theoretical concept is presented in order to facilitate a cognitive understanding of military operations in complex environments. Cognition about the distinct nature of these operations is the critical element missing from current doctrine regarding stability operations. It is the key to establishing "the kind of war" upon which stability forces are about to embark, and is necessary to prevent commanders from mistaking that war for something that it is not.

II. Stability Operations – The Theory and Principles

The fox knows many things,
But the hedgehog knows one big thing.
Archilochus (circa 750 BC)²⁴

The historian Isaiah Berlin was fond of this ancient fragment of poetry, considering it a figurative expression of the two fundamentally different perspectives man may possess. The 'hedgehog' sees the world under one universal organizing principle and acts in accordance with that coherent inner vision. To the 'fox' the world is undisciplined by universal rule, and he acts by seizing upon experiences as they are, and not as they might fit into a unitary truth. Understanding stability operations requires the eyes of the fox.

General Systems Theory and Clausewitz – Foundations of Theory

There is no universal form to social conflict, no set sequence of events. Globalization and heterogeneity work to give each conflict a unique and complex character. The complexity can not be understood, or worked through, using traditional military theory alone. The complexity may be comprehensible if one uses the tools of modern social science, in particular the multidimensional approach known as 'General Systems Theory'.²⁵ The 'general systems approach', blended with several key Clausewitzian ideas of war, serves well in setting a theoretical foundation for a doctrine of stability operations,²⁶ better than Greek iambic poetry, yet true to the vision of the fox.

'Systems thinking' holds that modern technology and society are so complex that traditional methods of understanding and dealing with problems are now inadequate. New holistic - or systems - approaches, inter-disciplinary in nature, offer an alternative.²⁷ Borrowing from the lexicon of engineering and natural sciences, systems thinking defines the world in terms of feedback, equilibrium, control and stability mechanisms in dynamic social-economic systems. A 'system' is a collection of parts that interact with each other to

function as a whole. Modern social systems contain multiple subsystems and numerous 'agents', and their interactions are highly complex.²⁸ Understanding these systems requires method that is the reverse of scientific reductionism. Instead of breaking things down to their smallest part for passive objective observation, systems science seeks instead to recognize critical systems in society, to identify essential interactions between systems and subsystems, and to act upon such knowledge to influence *positively* the behavior of these systems. It is a generalist, vice a specialist, approach. It recognizes that everything is connected to everything else, and that one can never solve a problem by doing just one thing, even 'one big thing'. This is critical to the application of military force in stability operations. Military force alone will not transform a society.²⁹ What is needed is a broad-sighted approach, with combined civil-military forces that can deal simultaneously with all of the critical social systems in conflict.³⁰

Systems theory applied to social conflict helps unravel the complexity caused by heterogeneity and globalization. It is useful to consider each region of conflict as a constellation of numerous interrelated systems connecting commercial, social, ethnic, religious, military, political and criminal interests. In any given case, the multitude of systems and interests can easily confuse stability operations planning. It is also helpful therefore to borrow from Clausewitz. He states that three *tendencies* must be considered in any explanation of conflict - the passion of the people, the character of military, and the reasoning powers of political leadership.³¹ These tendencies serve to categorize social systems along three broad lines. The character of military systems in situations of intra-state social conflict incorporate all armed groups participating in the struggle, including paramilitary and police forces. Leadership systems should include all community, religious, commercial leaders (including criminal leaders), as well as local and federal politicians. The system in which the passion of the people is best manifest is the media, in all its forms.³² These three groups of systems comprise all of the agencies exerting control

over the *will of the people*. These systems determine to what extent social conflicts may degenerate into bloody anarchy.

In each of the three categories of systems there are innumerable individual 'agents' at work,³³ each representing competing interests which, thanks to heterogeneity, help to split societies along tribal, ethnic, religious or ideological lines. And thanks to globalization, these competing systems and agents are linked to other interested parties around the globe.³⁴ When competition between systems and agents becomes violent and social conflict erupts, then all of the categories of social systems and all agents – domestic and international – are affected.

Stability operations interject US forces into this type of complex social conflict. Once deployed, stability forces become another component, or agent, in the competition between social systems. Their actions will have impact upon all systems and agents of the region. For this reason, the concept of military operations must be holistic, interdisciplinary and integrate the use of force into a broader operational design that makes coherent both the efforts of the military and of the civilian agencies working to resolve the conflict. Only with such a broad front approach will there be a *positive* impact made by military intervention in social conflict.³⁵ This is the strategy of the fox.

The Principles of the Integrated Approach

In stability operations, strategic aims must be translated into tactical missions that are coherent with a broad and integrative operational design, linking military and civil agency efforts. The function of translating somewhat abstract policy objectives into mechanistic tasks requires a distinct level of cognition amongst military officers. Cognition may be aided by understanding three key principles, derived from the common perspectives of five of the most prominent authorities on revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare – Mao Tse-Tung, Frank Kitson, John McCuen, Sir Robert Thompson, and Roger Trinquier.³⁶ These principles are:

1. The people remain the most important element in the conflict. They are the operational center of gravity for all sides.
2. Intelligence is critical to seizing and maintaining the initiative.
3. Campaign design must integrate military combat and non-combat, and civilian and information operations under one common operational concept, in an attempt to influence faction military, faction leadership and media systems in the conflict area.

These principles are examined in detail throughout the monograph. The remainder of this section introduces them in terms understandable to the US Army officer – as *aims, means and ways* – in an effort to enhance cognition.

The Aims of Stability Operations


The defining factor of stability operations is that opposing sides draw upon the same centre of gravity. This is a difference from general interstate conflict that is little understood, yet critical.

The center of gravity in all stability operations is the civilian populace.³⁷ This is the same for all opposing parties. Both warring factions and stability forces gain strength and freedom of action from the population. If the warring factions hold a significant percentage of the popular support, it will be difficult for stability forces to operate.³⁸ Conversely, if stability forces can convince the majority that theirs is a legitimate mandate, then they will have freedom to maneuver against rival factions, and there is a chance that a peaceful resolution of the conflict may be achieved.³⁹ “The *sine qua non* of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population”.⁴⁰

In stability operations the support of the people is paramount. The operations are a struggle for men's minds.⁴¹ Material destruction and death are critical factors, but it is the constant and pervasive efforts to manipulate the attitudes of the population that most characterizes stability operations. The historian Peter Paret states:

Military power plays essentially a secondary role: the decisive factor is the population, which is both the strongest force in the struggle as well as its primary object.⁴²

The overriding operational aim of stability operations is to persuade the majority to recognize the legitimacy of the intervening force's mandate and accept that the resolution of conflict is best achieved through peaceful means. Three operational objectives must be attained to this end, corresponding to the three groups of controlling social systems. Stability forces (military and police) must neutralize (or destroy) the warring faction military, para-military or guerrilla systems and persuade faction leaders to accept peaceful resolution. Simultaneously, civilian agencies (non-government organizations (NGOs) and international agencies (IAs)), together with military civil affairs, must persuade local civil leaders (politicians, business and social leaders) to accept peaceful resolution. Concurrently, civilian agencies and military information operations must utilize media systems to convince the majority of the people that resolution through peaceful means is the best alternative, isolating those who do not agree. The figure below illustrates the relationship between center of gravity, controlling social systems and stability force aims.



The 'Means' in Stability Operations

The center of gravity for both the warring faction(s) and stability forces is the civilian population, and the operational aim of all parties is to bend public attitude to recognize the legitimacy of one side over the other. The means available to achieve this object are numerous. The means available to faction(s) include all of the organizations of classic revolutionary warfare – groups dedicated to civil disturbance, terrorist cells, guerrilla units or conventional forces. Persuasion, coercion, propaganda and intimidation using a mix of peaceful and violent means – including terrorism or the threat of large-scale use of force – are the tactics of such organizations. They influence all of the controlling social systems identified above.

Clausewitz's three tendencies help categorize the controlling systems of any society: it has already been suggested that they may also help categorize stability force organization. Three broad categories of means may be available on stability operations – those dedicated to security, to civil renewal, and to public information. The job of establishing security in a region will fall naturally to intervening combat forces and to

international and local police forces. Together they will attempt to stop any fighting, disarm rival armed factions, establish law and order, and persuade faction commanders to accept peace.⁴³ The second category of 'means' may include local non-government organizations (NGOs) dedicated to social reforms, international agencies (IAs) monitoring conflict conditions and alleviating suffering, and a growing number of international non-government organizations representing benevolent groups the world over, whose interests range from emergency relief to evangelism.⁴⁴ These NGOs and IAs, supported by military civil affairs programs, work toward establishing local and federal institutions that represent the people and that are dedicated to peace, while at the same time seeking to improve health, education and economic systems.⁴⁵ The third category of 'means' involves the use of information. Information campaigns should be generated by combined stability force, US agency, NGO and IA radio and television stations, and printed presses. These strive to improve the image of the government (in insurgency), or of the international policy (in peace actions), to counter contrary propaganda, and to turn the passion of the people away from violence and toward peace.⁴⁶ These three categories – security forces, civil affairs and information agencies – together form the broad front of means available to stability operations planners.

The 'Ways' of Stability Operations

There are two other principles of stability operations: each is a critical requirement. The first is an effective intelligence system: the second is the integration of military and civilian effort.⁴⁷

Intelligence is the oil upon which the stability operations run. It is vital to mission success.⁴⁸ The use of a 'systems perspective' of stability operations demands a great deal of information gathering about what social systems are involved in the conflict area, which are the controlling systems, and what are the relationships between social systems. Continuous low-level intelligence operations must be conducted to ascertain these

important pieces of information. The intelligence process in stability operations is different than in general war. There is greater dependence upon locally-gathered background information and upon human intelligence (HUMINT).⁴⁹ While national level assets and sophisticated tactical intelligence hardware are important, they are not capable of providing to lower level military commanders the type of information most needed. Company, battalion and brigade commanders rely more upon local HUMINT for information about warring factions activity, and only local sources can accurately report on the pulse of the people.⁵⁰ Commanders need a great deal more low-grade background intelligence, collected over time from multiple local sources, in order to set the proper tempo and sequencing of operations.⁵¹ This information is gathered on every routine patrol and meeting, and with every interaction with locals and with other agencies. It is a product of nurtured trust.⁵² In this regard every soldier is an intelligence gatherer. Low grade intelligence, collected by the stability forces directly, gives all levels of command the most accurate assessment of the status at the center of gravity of stability operations.⁵³

Integration of operations – the systems approach – may be facilitated by the establishment of central coordinating agencies, such as a Civil-Military Operations Centre and civil-military committees.⁵⁴ Of first concern is the primacy of civilian authority – in the form of government officials during a counter-insurgency campaign, or senior UN or State Department representatives in peace actions. This is a necessary constraint. It may restrict military options, but it also lightens the burden upon stability forces and makes the eventual extraction of units easier.⁵⁵ Unless military government is established, as in post conflict situations, the military will always play a secondary role in stability operations. Either the host nation's government (in counter-insurgency), or an International Agency (such as Office of the UN High Representative to a region) will hold primacy of place in policy making, even at the tactical level.⁵⁶

In stability operations military and non-military means should be integrated to the lowest level possible: IAs and NGOs should work alongside platoons and squads. The critical command levels are at platoon, company and battalion.⁵⁷ General missions are given to these relatively small units, who are usually dispersed within large areas of responsibility. Local commanders devise and allocate tasks to fulfill the general mission requirements. Many of the missions require work that complements or supplements police and civilian efforts: therefore, integration of military tasks with local security, civic action, and information activities is important.⁵⁸ This is best achieved by establishing coordinating mechanisms that ensure cooperation between local agencies.⁵⁹

Some tasks involve responsibility for security. These may include joint military and civilian police patrols, vehicle checkpoints, convoy escorts, cordon and searches, riot control, monitoring of zones of separation, faction cantonment site inspections, and the use of deadly force to destroy non-compliant insurgent or faction strongpoints. Battalion and company commanders must also be prepared to employ forces in support of IAs and NGOs conducting civic action programs and information operations.⁶⁰ Rarely do these civilian agencies have sufficient manpower to conduct all of the necessary civil affairs tasks; and rarely is there sufficient military Civil Affairs or PSYOP soldiers to help them. Therefore, combat, combat support and service support soldiers should be considered for such tasks: these may include delivering food or wood, repairing infrastructure, providing medical assistance, helping to establish local agencies dedicated to social improvement, etc.⁶¹ Employment of this type gives soldiers tremendous currency amongst the locals, building trust, and allowing for easier access to intelligence.

Soldiers are also required to assist in information operations. Individuals may be tasked to support military, IA or NGO media or public affairs personnel. Patrols may be tasked to deliver PSYOP material. Beyond this, all soldiers conducting routine tasks amongst the people, whether security or civic action tasks, should understand that their

actions and their words contribute (or detract) from information operations' objective. All soldiers should be trained to behave professionally, and to deliver relevant 'theme' messages to local audiences. This is done to enhance the image of stability forces and to persuade the population and its leaders that a self-sustaining peace is the best thing for all parties.⁶²

Conclusion

This section has presented three general principles for the conduct of stability operations. The first states that the people are the center of gravity – for all sides. Operational objectives focus on persuading all of the social systems and agents that control the people that a peaceful resolution of the conflict is best. The second principle emphasizes the importance of intelligence. The third principle suggests that a 'systems' approach is required in order to integrate the efforts of the numerous units and agencies working in conflict areas. This systems approach provides a unified broad-front strategy that 'over-matches' the native systems that exert influence upon the center of gravity. The broad front includes three categories of operations – security, civil affairs and information.

These principles are presented to help understand the distinct nature of stability operations, in its main forms - counter-insurgency, peace action, and post-conflict. The principles are derived from a synthesis of military theories, and they require validation. Clausewitz tells us that the evidence used to provide explanation for, and to show application of, new principles must be drawn from historical example.⁶³ Although the Vietnam war would serve well to validate the principles presented above – the historical facts are still clouded by emotions. For this reason - and also to illustrate the enduring character of the principles - Section III analyzes the United States Army pacification operations in the Philippines 1898 – 1902, demonstrating that before counter-revolutionary warfare and systems thinking were articulated, men understood the need to see the 'many things' that make social conflict complex. A century ago commanders

understood that military force alone could not pacify a people. The perception of the fox is not new.

III. The Philippines 1899-1902 – The Way of The Fox

The Army's approach to the problem was notable for its diversity, including widespread civil affairs efforts, excellent propaganda, well-planned and -executed military operations, effective isolation of the guerrilla, protection of the population, and the involvement of the inhabitants in programs designed for their own protection and the eventual establishment of peace.⁶⁴

The officers commanding US forces in the Philippines at the turn of the century were undoubtedly better versed in ancient Greek poetry and the basic principles of engineering than in Clausewitz or 'revolutionary warfare'. Yet they demonstrated an innate understanding of the three principles outlined in Section II. Senior and junior military commanders recognized that the people were at the center of the conflict, and that intelligence was critical to success. They eventually also came to appreciate that a complimentary use of force, civil affairs and information operations was needed to resolve complicated local problems. This section emphasizes adherence to these principles during the campaign.

Major General Wesley Merritt and VIII Corps landed at Manila, in the Philippine archipelago, in August 1898. At the time Emilio Aguinaldo was the leader of a transitional revolutionary government replacing the previous Spanish regime. Aguinaldo had declared independence and begun a campaign of retribution against the Spanish clergy and citizenry, causing civil unrest. The relationship between Aguinaldo's government and the US military deteriorated and fighting broke out in February 1899. The warfare was conventional in character until December 1899, when Aguinaldo's forces, pushed into remote areas, adopted guerrilla tactics.⁶⁵ From January 1900 to July 1902 the US forces in the Philippines were involved in an intense social conflict which at its height engaged 70,000 soldiers.

The situation in the Philippines in 1898 was complex. The roots of economic and social disorder were 150 years old. Society had become polarized into four distinct heterogeneous socio-economic systems: the Spanish elite, the Filipino poor, Chinese merchants, and an emerging class Filipino elite.⁶⁶ Prior to 1896, the small ruling Spanish administration had held power by military force and by political and religious rule. Their needs were provided for by seven million native Filipinos, who lived in rural subsistent economies. The Spanish desired to keep these sub-systems 'closed' and controlled. This was done by the consolidation of power under municipal bureaucracies, and under Spanish friars, who owned vast tracks of agricultural land within their parishes. The Spanish upper class was linked to the Filipino poor by the friars and administrators; and also by two emerging middle classes – a Chinese merchant society and an Hispanic-Filipino merchant elite of Metizos, Filipinos and Indios. Over time this second group came to challenge Spanish control over economics and local politics, forming a distinct echelon of educated liberal nationalists. They resented Spanish monopoly of political power and the ownership of valuable land by the clergy.⁶⁷ This sentiment was shared by a re-emerging Chinese merchant class bent on opening the economic system to international trade. Both groups wanted to consolidate wealth through an open economy based upon export of large crops of hemp, sugar, indigo and tobacco. This would create a commodity-producing economy based upon centralized plantations. It would require the transfer of land and economic control from the church to the new Hispanic-Filipino elite: but the vast majority of Filipinos would remain subservient – working for large plantations. The polarization of these competing groups eventually led to revolution in 1896. The balance of power changed during the subsequent Spanish-American War when Admiral Dewey returned the exiled revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo to the Philippines. Aguinaldo formed a revolutionary government and an army representing the Hispanic-Filipino elite, and began oppressing the Spanish upper class and clergy. Civil conflict erupted.

US forces were thrust into this confusing environment without knowing their exact mission.⁶⁸ However, Merritt understood that the people were central in the conflict; and as an immediate objective he sought to bring back normalcy to Manila. His proclamation for administration of the city in August 1898 set the tone for subsequent army civil affairs efforts. It brought an end to anarchy in the city and began public works projects. A joint (civil-military) Board of Health was formed under the Chief Surgeon in order to put an end to a series of epidemics. Inspectors, health officials and doctors were assigned borough responsibilities, the port was monitored, water works were established, and the Provost Marshal enforced strict sanitation laws. The military became actively involved in revamping the city's public works – water, street lighting, fire stations, bridges and street repair – and soldiers did a considerable portion of the effort.⁶⁹

Tensions rose between Aguinaldo's revolutionary forces and the US troops. When open warfare began between them in February 1899, General Elwell Otis – in command since December 1898 – realized the need to pacify a populous succumbing to revolutionary propaganda. A visiting US presidential commission came to the same conclusion.⁷⁰ The commission produced a proclamation in April 1899 outlining the official US policy for the Philippines. From this emerged the notion of 'benevolent pacification'. The eleven points presented in the proclamation included the guarantee of civil rights, good civil service, a judicial system, open economy, near universal education and eventually self-government.⁷¹ Clearly the center of gravity in the subsequent campaign was to be the people, whose support was vital.

Under benevolent pacification the Army began several distinct categories of operations. It pursued and engaged revolutionary forces – driving them into the remote areas. At the same time the Army started institution building in all the large towns of the islands. US Army brigades took over responsibility for provinces and districts. Battalions distributed their forces to operate in 60-120 man sub-units, each tasked with the

pacification of a particular township. Once occupying a particular town these troops would build a school and establish law and order. They concurrently conducted security patrols to police the town and fighting patrols to find and destroy revolutionary units. They were encouraged to mix with the people to build confidence.⁷² A network of local contacts helped to provide necessary intelligence about local revolutionary activities, which in turn contributed to successful tactical actions by mobile columns of soldiers against the revolutionaries.

The practices of benevolent pacification were standardized under General Order No. 43 in August of 1899, which, while recognizing the US Military Governor in Manila and the US Military district commanders, authorized the establishment of Filipino municipal governments under military supervision.⁷³ In over 400 towns the military officially became responsible for local policing (including the formation of local native police forces), the collection and distribution of taxes, the regulation of commerce, the enforcement of sanitary codes, public works projects and the building and running of schools. The school effort was the most comprehensive – eventually producing a standard curriculum, with teaching conducted by both civilian and military personnel drawn from the ranks of the local units. Regular line officers and NCOs conducted critical civil administration,⁷⁴ and combat soldiers from the garrison companies did most of the civil affairs work. Junior officers and NCOs were assigned responsibility for outlining hamlets and charged with representation of these communities to the battalion and brigade commanders.

The civil affairs activities were supported by 'propaganda' that emphasized the enlightened ideas of the April Proclamation of US Intent.⁷⁵ The promise of improved social conditions appealed to many Filipinos. However, US and Revolutionary information competed, producing a hard fought information war. Until his capture in 1901, Aquinaldo was always able to muster propaganda support from internal dissidents and from powerful external agents. Anti-imperialists in America provided financial and material aid to

Aguinaldo and distributed anti-government leaflets both in the USA and in the Philippines.⁷⁶ This was reinforced by propaganda support from revolutionary sympathizers in Japan, China, Hong Kong and in Europe.

US pacification efforts were not universally successful. Where there was only a temporary military presence, or a small garrison, the initiative rested with the revolutionaries – to be gained by the US only when sizable patrols visited the town.⁷⁷ In these locales civil action programmes were minimal. In some districts the American policies heavily weighted toward combat with less civil action occurring. Sometimes the intensity of the conflict and lack of soldiers demanded this.⁷⁸ Sometimes this combat focus was the result of a particularly conservative and hard-nosed military commander.⁷⁹ US troops sometimes burned and looted towns in revenge campaigns, producing much ammunition for the revolutionary propaganda machine.⁸⁰

Despite the diversity of method employed in the various districts, the official policy of benevolent pacification, with its two-fold effort of combat and non-combat operations, was initially successful. General Otis felt that by December 1899, the revolution was at an end, and the war won.⁸¹ Army civil action programmes stepped up, a civil court system was established under military supervision. General Order No. 40 in March 1900, made the army supervise a standardization of local government practices in accordance with centralized direction from Manila. By mid 1900 it was demonstrable that where garrisons lived, there too were the benefits of benevolent pacification – with efficient tax collection, renewed public works, schools, health reform and growing economies.⁸² In May 1900 General Otis was replaced by General Arthur MacArthur, a man also dedicated to benevolent pacification. In the summer of 1900, the Taft Commission began the transfer of US Military Government responsibility to a joint US-Filipino civilian government.

Despite the illusion of victory, pacification was arrested in many areas in the last half of 1900. Aguinaldo's forces had not disbanded, but deliberately changed their style of

warfare. In December 1899 they stopped conventional actions and prepared for guerrilla operations. They saw weaknesses in the lenient policies of benevolent pacification and took advantage of the failure of US forces to attack them in remote areas. Throughout 1900, they established shadow revolutionary governments in the towns – sometimes employing civilian officials of the legitimate government.⁸³ They orchestrated very effective terrorist campaigns aimed at coercing locals back into active support of the revolution.⁸⁴ They established super intelligence gathering networks,⁸⁵ and underground newspapers. Local propaganda was also aimed at demoralizing and converting US soldiers,⁸⁶ and international propaganda tried to turn votes against McKinley in his bid for re-election in November 1900. Small-scale hit and run tactics were employed against US forces. The results were impressive. By October 1900, US casualties were rising, popular support was waning and the initiative was back with Aguinaldo.⁸⁷ US troop morale was at an all time low, and an active debate ensued regarding the virtue of maintaining benevolent pacification as the standing policy.⁸⁸ Leniency was questioned – the perception being that it demonstrated a weakness of resolve that was being exploited by revolutionaries.

In November 1900 MacArthur began a counter-offensive against the revolutionaries. He issued a proclamation instituting General Order No 100, which put firm controls on the activities of the native peoples and which allowed subordinate commanders authority to try and execute dissidents.⁸⁹ MacArthur's proclamation was the basis for an information campaign. It was translated into most of the native dialects and published in all of the major newspapers: 10,000 copies were distributed throughout the islands. MacArthur also pressed his subordinates to concentrate on isolating the revolutionaries: "...one of the most effective means of prolonging the struggle now left in the hands of the insurgent leaders is the organized system by which supplies and information are sent to them from occupied towns..."; the army was to "...interrupt and, if possible, completely destroy this system."⁹⁰

The military counter-offensive included attacks into previously isolated areas, aggressive patrolling, raids, and execution of certain guerrillas leaders. The results were immediately apparent. Guerrilla activity waned in most areas. The number of defections increased, encouraged by an amnesty program initiated by MacArthur. US casualty figures dropped and public confidence in the US military was restored. Intelligence gathering efforts subsequently increased. A new Division of military information was established in December 1900 charged with the function of collating and analyzing all captured documents.⁹¹

At the same time civil action programmes continued. MacArthur pushed garrisons out to over 500 communities, and increased the district road building schemes. One million dollars was spent on road construction and 600 miles were laid in 1901. This served the military's requirement for enhanced operational mobility, and also provided an effective example of civil public works projects with shared economic spin-offs.⁹² For over 500 municipal governments legislative and spending powers were transferred from military to civil authorities throughout 1901. The number of local medical facility programmes steadily increased.⁹³

Civil action was reinforced by the rapid growth of the newly formed Filipino Federalist Party – a political manifestation of public desire to seek democratic self-determination under US protection.⁹⁴ The Federal Party gave Filipinos a political alternative to the revolutionary shadow governments. The formation of an indigenous political party supporting the US mandate gave legitimacy to the US military efforts, and represented the final phase in the establishment of a comprehensive stabilization effort. The initiative swung decisively back in US favor by mid 1901.⁹⁵ In July the Philippine Constabulary and many native scout units were formed as a prelude to troop reduction.

The situation was stabilizing in the summer of 1901 when General Adna Chaffee took over from General MacArthur. A sad incident in September in Batangas, involving the

massacre of part of a US company led Chaffee to over react. He called for repressive measures.⁹⁶ This resulted in a severe campaign led by brigadier General Smith in Samar in early 1902 that stirred the population to open revolt against US authorities. Smith was relieved of command in April, but not before anti-imperialist began a public outcry against US troop behavior.⁹⁷ By July the archipelago was pacified. Meanwhile, in areas already free of insurgency, military sponsored civil action programs continued. The work of benevolent pacification was sustained despite Chaffee's hard line.

The US Army's stabilization of the Philippines was successful, but not because of any one decisive technique or tactic. The army won because it deliberately pursued a comprehensive approach employing every possible means to win public support. The three principles presented in Section II were evident in all aspects of the campaign. Public support was the center of gravity throughout. The Filipino population was given positive incentive under the 'benevolent pacification' policy, which was so lenient that the insurgents began to take advantage of it. Through guerrilla warfare they challenged the legitimacy of US Army operations. With MacArthur's concerted military offensives of 1900-1901, the leniency of 'benevolent pacification' was balanced by the 'negative incentives' instilled by General Order No 100.⁹⁸ The people acquiesced to military demands to sever links with the guerrilla movements. Intelligence was denied to the enemy, while information regarding guerrilla movements was more forthcoming. Good intelligence allowed for more aggressive military action, which regained the operational initiative from the insurgents. US information operations publicized all successes and helped to convince the majority of the people, and many reformed insurgents, of the legitimacy of the US cause. The shift in popular support in 1901 broke the back of the revolutionary movement: it was placed on the defensive by an integrated and multi-dimensional counter-revolutionary approach.

The pacification of the Philippines was a company, battalion and brigade commander's war. It was at these levels that the abstract policies of 'benevolent pacification' and General Order No. 100 were turned into concrete actions. It was at these lower levels that popular support was won or lost. Whether engaged in combat or civil affairs tasks, the common soldiers performed their duties amongst the people, learning popular ways and attitudes, establishing connections critical for mutual identification and respect, and spreading the themes of benevolent pacification. This helped to reduce the divisive impact of heterogeneity between the various classes of Filipinos. By 1902, in most areas, civilian and military efforts merged in a united movement, passing through stabilization toward self-sustaining peace. The tactical approaches of the local commanders may have varied, but the integrated and multidimensional character of their operations was largely the same.

IV. Stability Operations - A Model

A bad peace is even worse than war.
Cornelius Tacitus⁹⁹

US forces in the Philippines applied the three principles of stability operations outlined in Section II. Both they and Aguinaldo's insurgents intuitively understood the notion of a shared center of gravity in the people. US commanders also discovered the need for a balanced campaign that 'double enveloped' this center of gravity – destroying by force of arms the insurgent influence, while concurrently pacifying the native population through beneficence. They gathered intelligence from the local people. Using aggressive and adaptive tactics, they pursued, isolated and destroyed guerrilla forces throughout the islands. Through the establishment of municipal administrations, schools, and public works reconstruction, they demonstrated US commitment to long term amelioration of living conditions in the Philippines. Through various forms of media they advertised their intentions and their successes, eventually convincing the natives of the superiority of US goals. The soldiers demonstrated remarkable versatility in the conduct of these multifarious tasks.

Versatility is essential. Seldom will forces deployed upon stability operations have the luxury of purely functional employment. Official mandates may restrict the employment of military forces to a narrow set of security or humanitarian tasks. Military intransigence may impose further restrictions. However, the complexity of social conflict will eventually demand military involvement in all aspects of the social conflict.¹⁰⁰ If NGO and IA participation is limited, then pressure will be exerted upon military units to take the lead in relieving local suffering or in organizing local institutions. General Otis and Commissioner Schurman discovered this in 1899, and this led to the invocation of the policy of benevolent pacification.¹⁰¹ Conversely, when aid agencies are numerous, it will not be

enough to simply protect them: the protection of the local population will also be necessary, which will in turn require neutralization of armed factions. General MacArthur came to the same conclusion in 1900, when he decided upon implementing General Order No. 100.¹⁰² Versatility was required to operate under the duality of benevolent pacification and General Order no. 100.

Operational versatility requires a flexibility of mind and function. Military commanders at all levels need to be perceptive of the multidimensional nature of stability operations and adaptive to the functional needs of such operations. Failure to appreciate anything more than a narrow operational focus will lead to 'mission creep'. This is a cognitive matter: the techniques of cognitive science help. Through 'mental modeling' and experience, officers may begin to appreciate the distinctive level of cognition associated with stability operations, and learn the versatility critical to 'systems thinking'.

It is the purpose of this section to present a model for the design and conduct of modern day stability operations, a 'mental model' useful to cognition. Mental models are cognitive devices that make it easier to see how tasks and sub-tasks are integrated.¹⁰³ Models are descriptive, adaptive to circumstance, but require a degree of prescription to enforce coherency. They are an effective means of reducing complexity.¹⁰⁴ The mental model presented here is in the form of a 'campaign design' for units employed on prolonged stability operations. It suggests that 'battle plans' are not sufficient: brigades, battalions and companies need longer-term 'campaign plans' that guide operations distributed over time and distance, low-level plans that reflect the vagaries of local circumstance. Terms familiar to the US Army officer are used – end state, decisive points, lines of operations, etc. However, definitions are modified to accommodate the distinct nature of stability operations. This model also integrates the three enduring principles presented above. It is presented here as a cognitive tool, recognizable to commanders, yet general enough to be memorable and adaptable. Figure 3 illustrates the model.




Figure 3 -Lines of Operations

End State

In multidimensional stability operations the 'end state' conditions are general and abstract. They include demilitarization of the conflict, reconciliation of warring factions, and a return to an internationally acceptable normalcy of citizen life. They usually address the violence and suffering associated with heterogeneity. There may be contentious political issues - such as the separation of territories, the enfranchisement of previously oppressed minorities, or the establishment of plurality in a political system. Some form of agreement reached between warring factions regarding such issues will make the job of stability forces much easier. The Dayton Agreement is an excellent example. If an agreement has not been reached prior to stability force intervention, it is critical that a 'statement of intent' be published by the stability force as a first step toward gaining faction approval. The April 1899 proclamation of US intent in the Philippines provided Filipinos with an idea of the end state conditions envisaged by the Americans, and was instrumental in gaining initial support for the US cause.

Agreements signed by opposing leaders, or declarations of intent, give legitimacy to stability force actions, including the use of deadly force. They also provide the policy framework within which lower level commanders identify local end state conditions that may fulfill the vision of the overall operational end state. This is essential. Brigade, battalion and independent company commanders, working with local IA and NGO leaders, formulate a shared vision of the local conditions toward which all agencies will work. This will help create a unity of purpose. Common understanding of local end state conditions is vital when all agencies negotiate and broker deals daily with local civilian and military leaders. Without unity of purpose, stability force, IA and NGO activities may well work against each other.

Center of Gravity

The center of gravity is always the population of the affected area. The people are the "hub of all power" - all sides requiring their support in order to have freedom of movement. Without their support, operations will be conducted in a resistance medium and freedom of action curtailed. It is a 'first principle' that gaining the support of the majority, and gaining their active commitment to peace, will be the most important battle for stability forces.

Often a local population will be controlled by a partisan political group, representative of only one element of the society, and dedicated to the retention of power by that particular tribal or ethnic group. Aguinaldo's 'hidden municipal governments', for example, represented a Filipino social and economic elite, and excluded the millions of indigenous natives of the islands. The political parties of Bosnia today are likewise exclusive. In both examples these parties used a mix of promise and threat, blended with effective propaganda, to cajole and coerce public opinion into accepting their heterogeneous consolidation of power.¹⁰⁵

It is the role of stability forces, alongside IAs and NGOs, to counter heterogeneity and break the control exerted by warring factions or insurgents over popular will, just as MacArthur broke the control exerted by Aguinaldo's revolutionaries.

Operational Objectives

Operational objectives define how military action will affect the center of gravity. In stability operations the overarching objective will normally be to create widespread acceptance of stability force legitimacy, and the people's active commitment to peace. Because the center of gravity consists of a number of controlling systems and agents, the overall objective should be broken down into specific objectives that 'attack' each of the key controlling systems, and the links between them. The first specific objective should be to convince the indigenous military, paramilitary and police leaders to accept the peaceful

resolution of conflict. The second specific objective is to convince the community and political leadership that the stability force mandate is the best alternative for economic growth and social reform. The third objective is to use the media to make the people realize that the stability forces have a legitimate purpose, the embracement of which will end conflict and produce positive change. Achievement of all three specific objectives will enable the creation of the end state conditions.

Decisive points

Decisive points in stability operations are those events that if realized will give significant advantage to stability force efforts, and fulfill in part the specific operational objectives. They may include many things: the establishment of liaison between warring groups; the separating, cantonment and disarming of opposing forces; the destruction or neutralization of non-compliant warring factions; the reduction of violent crime and the creation of a secure environment; the establishment of a viable police and judicial system; the relief of human suffering; the emergency reconstruction of needed public facilities; the contracting of long term public works projects; the creation of an open economy; the establishment of local institutions such as hospitals and schools; the return home of displaced persons and refugees, the conduct of fair elections, the provision of freedom of speech; and the neutralization of adverse faction propaganda.

Local level decisive points should match the sequence of events of the theater campaign plan. For example; when federal elections occur throughout a territory, local plans should reflect this as a decisive point. There may also be local decisive points that do not directly correlate with higher plans, but are essential to local success (e.g. the rebuilding of a school or the restoration of local public works). It is incumbent upon local commanders to identify critical decisive points specific to their area of responsibility, and to make these the goals of their joint-agency operations. End state conditions may seem abstract: therefore, the expression of concrete decisive points is important.¹⁰⁶ While the

end state may not be attainable during a particular unit's operational tour, individual decisive points often will be, and provide measurable goals for unit and sub-unit actions.

Lines of Operations

The achievement of the decisive points is dependent upon organization of military and civil agency efforts occurring on mutually reinforcing lines-of-operations.¹⁰⁷ There are three lines of operations in our model – corresponding to the three Clausewitzian elements of conflict:

- a. The 'military/security' line of operations is dedicated to creating the conditions of security and stability that in turn enables progress upon the 'civil affairs' line of operations.
- b. The civil affairs line of operations relieves human suffering and works towards establishing long term political, economic and social reform to alleviate the root cause of conflict.
- c. The information line of operations aims to promote the image of the stability forces and to produce support for the stability force mandate.

All three lines of operations move toward the overall objective of gaining widespread acceptance of the peace. The lines of operation link the decisive points to the specific objectives. The achievement of each point will effect in part the specific operational objectives. Although depicted in linear form in the model, the 'lines' of operations are actually more centrolineal - or even concentric - then linear: each decisive point has impact upon all other decisive points, upon all lines of operations, upon all specific objectives, and upon the center of gravity.

There is no separate line of operations for intelligence - the second principle of stability operations. It is integral to all three lines. This will be discussed below.

Synchronization

Decisive points on the lines of operations mutually reinforce each other (as depicted by the hash lines on the diagram). Therefore the integration and coordination of activities on all lines of operations is essential. This is the essence of a 'systems approach' to stability operations. It demands that military commanders at all levels take responsibility for supporting and synchronizing activities on all lines of operations – whether or not the lead agency is military, an IA, or an NGO.¹⁰⁸ Any activity conducted without consideration of events on other lines of operations may have a detrimental affect on other agency's activities. If progress on one line of operations is arrested, then progress on the other lines will also slow down. Systems thinking provides the only assured way of overcoming such friction.¹⁰⁹ An integrative systems approach is best facilitated by apportioning and integrating appropriate military and civilian agency forces at low levels, where that have direct contact with the population of area in conflict.

Security Tasks

Integrated operations require that the military participate on each line of operations. The more integrated the military and civilian agencies, the more constitutive will be the net effects. It is expected that the military will initially take the lead on the security line of operations, ending or containing the armed conflict to a point that allows police forces to take the lead. An international police task force may support military efforts, become the lead agency when the fighting stops, or it may prepare a civilian police force to take the lead.¹¹⁰ However, even after the military stability forces are no longer the lead agency on this line of operations, they will still be required to assist in the achievement of decisive points, conducting joint patrols with international or local police, and conducting demonstrations to deter warring factions and criminals.

The identification and isolation of criminals is a complicated but essential task on the security line of operations. Criminal activity may be well organized and tightly woven

into the local political, military and economic fabric.¹¹¹ Neutralizing and eradicating this criminal element may mean a complete overhaul of the political and commercial systems. This can only happen over a long term, and with significant progress on all three lines of operations. It will not happen without the continued presence of a credible and lethal force on the security line of operations: a force that adds credence to demands made upon faction political, military, police and criminal leaders by the international agencies dedicated to social reform. Criminal activities are as great a threat to stability force efforts as is renewed open conflict between warring factions or insurgents. Crime can not be ignored.

Civil Affairs Tasks

Military activity on the civil affairs line of operations is the function of military Civil Affairs detachments, reinforced by local 'homespun' platoon and company civil action or public works projects. Combat forces not employed in patrolling or training should be active in civil affairs.¹¹² Combat unit participation in civil affairs enhances this line of operations, integrates military and civil agency actions, raises the image and profile of the military force and keeps the soldiers busy with useful work. Tasks may be various, from helping poor locals renovate or repair war damaged houses, building public schools or playgrounds, cleaning, delivering wood or humanitarian supplies, etc.. Normal soldiers can perform these tasks with ease. Activity on this line of operations can be facilitated by military Civil Affairs officers, or conducted independently by local commanders. They should be planned in conjunction with local NGO, IA support and coordinated with these agencies. When sensitive political events are planned – such as elections or the return of minority refugees - then military forces must be prepared to revert back to security tasks in direct support of such decisive point events.

Information Operations Tasks

Military activity on the information line of operations should also be integrated with civilian agency activities. The military may run a theater-wide PSYOP and Public Information campaign. This will seldom be decisive at local levels.¹¹³ It must be reinforced with local military and civil agency information operations aimed at raising the image of the local stabilization forces, and at educating and influencing the people and leaders. It must also counter opposing propaganda. To facilitate this, a flexible and well-resourced campaign must be conducted at lower tactical levels to ensure information dominance.¹¹⁴ Stability force translators should listen to and read all local papers and report on content that is detrimental to the force's mandate. Battalions and companies should have open access to radio and television broadcast facilities. They must have authority to create and distribute written information without going through centralized high level headquarters, or they must be provided the technology to request and receive written or broadcast authority at very short notice.¹¹⁵ Most importantly, they must coordinate and integrate their efforts with other civil agencies.¹¹⁶ NGOs and IAs may be able to provide radio transmitters or newspaper production equipment, or to pay for access to such means. Joint messages will be more effective than separate civilian agency or military messages. All messages must be consistent with policies of higher headquarters and with the framework peace agreement or statement of intent. While specialist information operations officers may coordinate information efforts, local commanders should reinforce this using their own troops. Employing soldiers to run radio programs, or to help reproduce and distribute information material is essential.

Battalion and Company commanders should retain the flexibility to task-organize their forces to achieve maximum benefit on each line of operations. Initially almost all soldiers will be employed in the security line of operations, creating the conditions of stability necessary to start work on the other lines. But liaison with civilian agencies

operating on the other lines must be established as early as possible. As hostility is reduced, security will pass incrementally to international or local police. Soldiers can then be re-tasked to conduct activities on the other lines of operations. They must always retain the means to revert immediately back to combat tasks of the first line of operations if the situation demands. Again, versatility is essential.

Command and Control

Utilizing a flexible and multifunctional approach to task-organization requires that commanders remain actively involved in organizing and steering the coordinated efforts of all NGOs and IAs in the local area of operations. While this is done at a higher level by the CIMOC, the function must also happen at lower levels by weekly meetings and established common procedures.

The battalion or company commander in an area can facilitate the integration of all agencies under a common operating concept. He will have the facilities and means to organize planning conferences, to provide communication and logistic help, and to create confidence in the long-term stabilization effort¹¹⁷. The stability forces may function as a lead agency on all lines of operations until an appropriate civil authority is established to take on lead agency responsibility (just as the military government of the Philippines worked until transition to the civil government under the Taft commission). Task-organizing military detachments and civilian agencies to work together to achieve specific decisive points is much like task-organizing for combat missions. The mixing of military and civilian functions in civil affairs and information operations must not be shunned – it is the same as organizing for combined arms operations, each component covering the weaknesses of the other – producing synergy.¹¹⁸

The employment of military forces on all three lines of operations will be greatly facilitated by having designated liaison officers or NCOs tasked to all critical civilian, NGO or IA organizations operating on a permanent basis in the area of operations. Even at the

company and platoon level (if operating in separate locales), liaison channels must be established with the local organizations working for the same ends.

Liaison officers and NCOs may be designated for each major agency or group of like agencies operating in the area. Liaison should also be maintained with warring factions – if possible – and with local civil leaders, community leaders and civil servants. The military commander will achieve many of his most influential actions through negotiations with these agencies, persuading opponents or neutrals and coordinating efforts for security and social improvement.¹¹⁹ Liaison officers and NCOs will assist in setting up such negotiations, and in monitoring progress of actions once they are mutually agreed to. Liaison personnel will also serve as an invaluable intelligence collection asset.

Intelligence

Intelligence is the key to success in stability operations. The most important asset will be HUMINT gathered from multiple local sources. This will give the commander the large amount of low-grade background intelligence he needs to develop a comprehensive picture of the local situation, necessary to keep his operations relevant. Intelligence from higher sources will be important and must be collated with the local grade material. ALL activity within the area of operations has potential intelligence value – economic, criminal, social, political as well as military and paramilitary. Battalion and Company commanders should feel that it is their business to know everything about their area of responsibility, as suggested by Brigadier General Bell one hundred years ago in Batangas.¹²⁰ To this end every officer and NCO acting on every task – combat or non-combat - must consider himself a intelligence gathering agent and submit reports after each task that help to build a comprehensive intelligence picture. Reports are assessed by local commanders and sent to higher headquarters. Likewise, constant patrolling of the area of operations should provide a good idea of change. Patrolling soldiers should not stay clear of the local populace, but must mingle with them, sharing coffee or snacks and subtly gathering a

correct feel for the mental attitude of the populace.¹²¹ This serves a dual purpose of reinforcing the positive image of the military force, every soldier being also a psychological warfare agent.

It is the difficult job of the commander, at every level, to coordinate these functions – integration, liaison and intelligence gathering, using all available combat and non-combat means, and operating on three mutually supporting lines of operations to achieve decisive points. His ability to do this successfully will depend on good tactics.

Tactics

There are but two dynamics in war – holding and striking.¹²² These dynamics have traditionally been defined in terms of defensive and offensive combat missions. In stability operations, however, there are also non-combat defensive and offensive missions. The relationship between combat and non-combat defensive and offensive missions is best understood by considering defensive action as any task – combat or non-combat – that has a negative or passive purpose or effect (holding), and offensive action as any task that has a positive or proactive purpose or effect (striking).¹²³

Combat forces conducting search and destroy operations against insurgents or non-compliant warring factions are seeking a positive effect: they have an offensive purpose that once achieved will enhance security. Combat forces conducting routine patrols and checkpoints, demonstrating their presence and potential lethality, fulfill a negative or passive purpose: their defensive posture bolsters an already peaceful and secure environment. It matters not that these troops apply deadly force: it is their purpose that defines their missions as offensive or defensive. In the same vein, troops and civil agencies conducting civil affairs or information operations aimed at changing a local condition or attitude have a positive purpose and are therefore on the offensive. If such troops are not actively pursuing a decisive point on the civil affairs or information lines of

operations then their actions are defensive in nature - ensuring that local conditions do not deteriorate. Figure 3 illustrates these differences.




Figure 3 – Offensive and Defensive Tactics on Different Lines of Operations

Defensive and offensive tactics are used to achieve each decisive point on each line of operations. As depicted in Figure 3, in order to achieve general disarmament, The military commander conducts offensive actions to find and seize weapons from local

armed groups (including paramilitary and criminal elements). Concurrently, civil affairs personnel prepare contracts to institute economic renewal programs as a 'carrot' to the local leaders if they help enforce compliance with disarmament, and combat forces conduct a weapons amnesty program to encourage civilian disarmament. At the same time stability force translators monitor the local media and report any propaganda contrary to the disarmament effort. To support local elections, combat forces conduct defensive task to demonstrate military capability and deter potential disruptions, while simultaneously they support civil agency offensive operations in the management of the elections. Combat forces may also support offensive information operations to promote electoral fairness and compliance. Holding and striking in this manner – across three lines of operations – provides the commander a comprehensive systems approach, wherein he has flexibility to respond in a number of ways to 'attack' a particular non-compliant agent. Commanders on stability operations must learn to visualize offensive and defensive tactics in this manner. Integration of military and civil agency work, on centrolineal lines of operations, is easier when all efforts are considered in this tactical framework. The operational initiative is maintained over local warring factions by retaining the flexibility to switch back and forth from combat to non-combat offensive actions - keeping the dissident factions off balance, while at the same time maintaining the confidence of the local populace. This is not at all unlike MacArthur's use of benevolent pacification and General Order No. 100 to provide his forces with the means to induce both negative and positive effects as necessary.

Conclusion

In summation, the model presented above conforms to the three enduring principles of stability operations discussed in Sections II and III. The center of gravity is the people. All agencies in the operation integrate their activities within locally tailored campaign plans. They share a common purpose. Low level integration of military and

civilian forces help in developing integrated and widespread intelligence gathering capability. Intelligence gives commanders the ability to conduct offensive and defensive tasks to seize and maintain the initiative and achieve decisive points. Attainment of a decisive point in turn affects the achievement of other decisive points and the specific operational objectives. This broad-front and integrated systems approach provides military forces their best method to move the center of gravity toward a lasting and self-sustaining peace.

V. Conclusion

It is wrong to view war as strictly an inter-state affair. Bloody social conflicts between different ethnic, religious or tribal groups pre-date the rise of the modern nation state. In the post-Cold War era such conflicts have become potentially more violent and destabilizing. The violence comes from an increase in heterogeneity arising in the ruins of European and Soviet imperialism. In an age of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fanatical heterogeneity may ultimately lead to unprecedented destruction and death. Social conflicts cause immense destabilization because of the emergence of a global consciousness, a globalized culture connecting social, economic and political interests via advanced telecommunications technology. Bloody inter-entity clashes now have immediate impact beyond regional boundaries. The dual phenomena of heterogeneity and globalization gives modern social conflict as much relevance as inter-state war.

United States national policy objectives sometimes demand that the US military intervene into complex social conflicts. Interventions of this sort are called stability operations. The development of doctrine for stability operations is problematic: traditional military theory does not adequately address non-interstate violence, destabilization and complexity. The primary purpose of this monograph is to establish a theoretical foundation for stability operations doctrine that accommodates these characteristics.

A secondary purpose of the monograph is to propose a model for the conduct of stability operations at unit and sub-unit levels. The theory and the model are presented as cognitive tools to help officers understand the 'kind of war' upon which they will embark when deployed upon stability operations. Together the theory and model attempt to alleviate the impacts of complexity, and increase cognition about the distinct nature of

these operations; and to help illustrate the need for a wider perspective on the application of military force in complex situations.

The monograph presents three enduring principles for stability operations and illustrates the principles in an historical case study of the Philippines 1898-1902. The first principle maintains that the center of gravity is always the people of the contested area. The second principle states that in order to gain knowledge of the people, it is necessary to collect a large amount of low-grade background intelligence, which in turn will facilitate effective tactical operations. The third principle suggests that to eliminate the influence of any competing forces and win popular support, stability force commanders need to conduct integrated multidimensional operations that effectively employ combat, non-combat military and civilian agency assets in a coherent campaign. This 'systems approach' to operations requires a versatility of mind and function. Versatility is vital.

Versatility was demonstrated in the Philippines by US Army officers. These men had an innate understanding of the multidimensional nature of the conflict. Most of them believed in American expansionism, knew that military force was not enough to win over the people of the new 'protectorate', and were committed to policies of leniency and to civil rejuvenation in the tradition of post Civil War Reconstruction.¹²⁴ These officers also were 'Victorian' in nature, endowed with a progressive spirit, and dedicated to a belief in a well-roundedness of character, uninhibited by over-specialization.

Military versatility is less obvious today. Modern Armies rely upon specialization of function when allocating responsibilities on operations. Civil affairs, intelligence and information operations are specific functional areas; their work lying outside of perceived normal range of combat arms duties and tasks. On stability operations, however, specification is challenged. Seldom will units have the luxury of purely functional employment. Therefore, like their predecessors in the Philippines, US Army officers need to realize the distinct differences between operations where military imperatives are

dominant and those in which political imperatives come first. They need to understand that the application of military force alone will not pacify a people. Civil affairs and information operations, conducted by both military and civilian agencies, are vital to success. The employment of combat soldiers to conduct these non-combat functions may be necessary and advantageous. Coordination of all assets in a prolonged campaign requires knowledge and skill in multifunctional areas. A systems approach is needed. This by its very nature demands versatility, not specialization.

Military specialization in the US Army is deeply entrenched. It is not within the scope of this monograph to discuss ways to enhance versatility in an army dedicated to specialization. However, it is believed that acquiring versatility is first and foremost a cognitive matter. It requires the perspective of the fox, seeing the world in terms of adaptive experience in many types of complex social environments, and not in terms of one unitary phenomenon such as inter-state war.

Endnotes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88-89

² Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 41. Corbett's articulation of this important function is more clear and pertinent than Clausewitz's.

³ J.F. Holden-Rodes, and Peter Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder", in Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict ed. by Graham H. Turbiville (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1995), 23 and 25.

⁴ A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House, 1998), 21.

⁵ New versions of FM 100-5, FM 100-22, and FM 100-40 exist in draft form only, distribution is limited at time of writing.

⁶ Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 59; and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 5-11, and 541. Morgenthau's thesis relies upon clear distinction between vital and non-vital interests and provides the 'realist' view of moral obligation in international relations.

⁷ Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1945 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 234. Total war must include employment of a nation's political and social will, economic and industrial and full military might.

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595.

⁹ Michael Howard, "When are Wars Decisive?" *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 126-35.

¹⁰ John Garnett, "Limited War", in Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, ed. by John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 123.

¹¹ William J. Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 17.

¹² Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 12. Hanson argues that since ancient Greece the western world is predisposed to the quick and violent resolution of war via decisive battle; this being the most efficient means of waging war in democratic states.

¹³ Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), 47.

¹⁴ Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 126-127.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 194-195.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 35.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 321.

¹⁹ Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994): and, The Ends of the Earth (New York: Random House, 1996), 45. Kaplan is a 'travel writer' and journalist for the *Atlantic Monthly*.

²⁰ J.F. Holden-Rodes and Peter Lupsha have also observed the power of organized crime syndicates. These authors argue that tribalism (they use 'retribalization') will transform national boundaries, causing upheaval and the proliferation of violence and crime. They claim that "chaos theory...often seems the most appropriate explanatory method for much of what is happening in the world"(p.17). International crime organizations and criminal dictators are destabilizing nations and regions. Their existence and influence are 'trans-jurisdictional' and 'transnational', highlighting the inadequacies of using military means to deal with them (p.13). J.F. Holden-Rodes and Peter Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder", in Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict, ed. by Graham H. Turbiville (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1995), 9.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 252-254.

²² M.Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 145. Complexity theory refers to systems that are complex in the sense that a great number of independent agents are

interacting with each other in a great many ways. See also: Dietrich Doerner, The Logic of Failure (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 43-47.

²³ Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (New York: Oxford university Press, 1996), 178.

²⁴ Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc, 1953), 1.

²⁵ Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, Foundations, Development Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968), vii.

²⁶ Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 3. Naveh utilizes General Systems Theory in explanation of operational art in war, clearly offering it up as a general method of explanation for all military activity, including stability operations.

²⁷ Bertalanffy, General System Theory, xx.

²⁸ Dietrich Doerner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 38.

²⁹ James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Ft. Leavenworth: Reprint by The United States Army Command and General Staff College with permission of Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 135.

³⁰ Draper L. Kauffman, Jr., Systems One: An Introduction to Systems Thinking (St. Paul: Future Systems, Inc, 1980), 35.

³¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

³² This is particularly true in ex-communist or nationalist countries with a state-run media. Such countries live under nationalist propaganda – sometimes referred to as “the Big Lie” – and ALL media messages are presented in accordance to the nationalist agenda. This monopoly on the media has tremendous effect in influencing public opinion if it is backed by intimidation; see Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 98.

³³ Agent refers to a person in a position of power or influence, see; Dietrich Doerner, The Logic of Failure, 38.

³⁴ Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber & Faber, 1974), 17-18.

³⁵ Systems theory advocates that if the boundaries of a problem are bigger than the largest system which has the power to solve it, then you must give the problem to a system big enough to exceed the problem boundaries, or divide the problem up and solve sub-components first. This is the dilemma of stability operation planners. Military forces alone seldom over match social problem boundaries. Ideally then, the military teams up with civilian agencies to exert a combined influence greater than the problem set. If this is not possible it can only deal with sub-components of the problem system, which is inefficient and costly in terms of energy and time. See; Kauffman, Systems One: An Introduction to Systems Thinking, 34.

³⁶ Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Ft Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Reprint, 1991), 53-57. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), 290. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 56-61, 113, 140, and 182. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966), 50-55. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. (Leavenworth: USACGSC, CSI Reprint, 1985), 6-8, 29 and 85. See also: William F. Furr, Low-Intensity Conflict: Imperatives for Success (Langely Air Force Base, Centre for Low-Intensity Conflict, 1987), 2-4.

³⁷ Douglas Blauford and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War. (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 139. See also, Howard L. Dixon, Operational Art in Low Intensity Conflict. (Langely AFB: Army-Air Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 1987), 8: and, The Strategic Studies Institute, The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1987), 63-64.

³⁸ Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 32.

³⁹ Howard Dixon, Operational Art, 10. See also, Douglas Blauford, Who Will Win?, 17.

⁴⁰ Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 8.

⁴¹ Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, 289.

⁴² Peter Paret, “The French Army and La Guerre Revolutionnaire”, *Journal of the Royal United services Institute*, CIV, February 1959, p.59.

- ⁴³ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War (Bromley: Galago Publishing Ltd., 1990), 55 and 60. See also, Douglas Blauford, Who Will Win?, 31.
- ⁴⁴ William J. Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 23.
- ⁴⁵ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 97.
- ⁴⁶ Douglas Blauford, Who Will Win?, 37.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 39. See also, David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds. Armies in Low-intensity Conflict (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989), 197; and, Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, 284.
- ⁴⁸ Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, 287.
- ⁴⁹ Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 73.
- ⁵⁰ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 72; Kitson, Bunch of Five, 287; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 77 and 96; and David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds. Armies in Low-intensity Conflict, 254.
- ⁵¹ Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 73.
- ⁵² Ibid., 91-92.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 77.
- ⁵⁴ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 54-55.
- ⁵⁵ Kitson, Bunch of Five, 284, 290.
- ⁵⁶ John, Garnett, "Limited War" in Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies. Ed by John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams. (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 125 and 138. See also Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 54.
- ⁵⁷ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 60; and also, David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds. Armies in Low-intensity Conflict, 197.
- ⁵⁸ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 55 and 60-61; and also, Douglas Blauford, Who Will Win?, 19 and 31; and also, John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 62.
- ⁵⁹ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 54.
- ⁶⁰ Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 71.
- ⁶¹ Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 96; and, Douglas Blauford, Who Will Win?, 41 and 61; also, Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 91; and John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, 60-62.
- ⁶² Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War, 60-6; also see, and John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War 60-61 and Kitson, Bunch of Five, 285-7.
- ⁶³ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 171.
- ⁶⁴ John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krag: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 290. The historiography of the Philippines insurrection shows renewed interest in the campaign in the wake of the Vietnam War. Some, such as Gates, look to the Philippines for lessons learned in the 'proper' conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Others took the opposite perspective - attempting to demonstrate consistency in military insensitivity and incompetence from 1900 through the Vietnam War. This second perspectives concentrates upon some of the tactical set backs and atrocities of the Philippines campaign, and upon the contemporary racial attitudes of the US soldiers; see Richard E. Welch Jr., Response to Imperialism: the United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902 (Chapel hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), and; Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
- ⁶⁵ Arthur MacArthur, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, US Army, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Vol 1 (Manila: HQ Div of the Philippines, 1902), 2.
- ⁶⁶ Gates, Schoolbooks and Krag, 8-9.
- ⁶⁷ Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1917), 37.
- ⁶⁸ Gates, Schoolbooks and Krag, 5-6.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., 57. And MacArthur, Annual Report, Appendix F, 18. Lack of hostile action between revolutionaries and US troops allowed Merrit to employ his soldiers in a myriad of non-traditional tasks in

support of civic renewal. Many accounts describe the specific duties – from enforcing sanitation laws to running the customs house. See; Gantenbein, C.U., The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish Insurrection (Salem, OR: J.R. Whitney, State Printer, 903), 48-49.

⁷⁰ Jacob Gould Schurman, Philippine Affairs – a Retrospect and Outlook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), 8-12.

⁷¹ Gates, Schoolbooks and Kraggs, 80-81.

⁷² Report of Major Cornelius Gardener, Affairs of the Philippine Islands: Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 881-883. See Also: Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 109.

⁷³ Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 21. See also; MacArthur, Annual Report, Appendix M, 37.

⁷⁴ MacArthur, Annual Report, Appendix M, 93. Brigadier General Franklin J. Bell encouraged his subordinates to maintain close contact with the people, to win their confidence and to break the dependence of the natives on local *presidente* for news and policies. Bell states that portions of the company areas be assigned to NCOs and junior officers and to encourage them "to spend time as much of their time therein as may be consistent with the performance of their regular guard duties. They should be permitted to visit these barrios and live therein as much as possible with a view to becoming thoroughly acquainted with the people and gaining their confidence in order that they may have someone whom they can rely on to represent their needs or grievances to the commanding officer.... When poor people have some legitimate request or complaint to make and are accompanied to the commanding officer by an American soldier to present it for them, they will come to believe that officers and soldiers take a real interest in their welfare." See Bell, Circulars, 39. Also see; Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899-1902, 110-111.

⁷⁵ Schurman, Retrospect, 8-12. See also Gates, Schools and Kraggs, 95.

⁷⁶ Linn, The US Army, 27. See also; Gates, Schools and Kraggs, 100.

A case has been made that US domestic politics may have prolonged the conflict, see; Carl Crow, America and the Philippines (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1914), 35 and 37.

⁷⁷ MacArthur, Annual report, Appendix M, 38.

⁷⁸ Most notably BG Frederick Funston's pacification of the Fourth District, see: Brian Linn, The US Army, 70-80.

⁷⁹ Most notably BG Jacob H. Smith's campaign in Samar 1902; see Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941 (Washington: Center of Military History United States Army, 1998), 133-134.

⁸⁰ Linn, The US Army, 178-9 note 70.

⁸¹ MacArthur, Annual Report, 2-5.

⁸² *Ibid.*, Appendix M, 38.

⁸³ J. F. Bell, Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, 1st December 1901 – 1st December 1902 (Batangas, HQ Third Separate Brigade, 1902) Circular No. 5, pp. 4 and 7.

⁸⁴ The most common terrorist action was assassination, conducted in public and for minor transgressions. All natives of the Philippines were forbidden to deal in any capacity with US forces, on pain of death. For descriptions of these practices see; MacArthur, Annual Report, 2-5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁸⁶ Gates, Schools and Kraggs, 160.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

⁸⁸ Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, ii – v. See also, MacArthur, Annual Report, 5.

⁸⁹ MacArthur, Annual Report, 6-10. MacArthur's December proclamation explaining G.O. No. 100, and his duty to protect the people of the Philippines was instrumental in turning public opinion. 10,000 copies were distributed. See page 18.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 18.

⁹¹ Ibid., Appendix A, 4.

⁹² Gates, Schoolbooks and Kraggs, 211.

⁹³ MacArthur, Annual Report, Appendix H, 24. The benefits of the theater wide native vaccination program are described in Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, 33.

⁹⁴ MacArthur, Annual Report, the evolution of the Federal Party and its contribution to the campaign are well documented here, pp. 59-80.

⁹⁵ Gates, Schoolbooks and Kraggs, 225.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 250.

⁹⁷ Fortunately the army's reputation was somewhat redeemed by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, who ran the Batangas pacification at the same time; a more effective if not more lenient affair, see; Linn, The US Army, 152-161, and for descriptions of Bell's techniques see; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars.

⁹⁸ Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency, 135.

⁹⁹ Cornelius Tacitus, Tactitus The Annals of Imperial Rome trans. by Michael Grant (new York: Penguin Books, 1979).

¹⁰⁰ Probably the most telling example of this was in Somalia, see; Durch, UN Peacekeeping, 323.

¹⁰¹ Jacob Gould Schurman, Philippine Affairs – a Retrospect and Outlook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), 8-12.

¹⁰² Arthur MacArthur, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, US Army, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Vol 1 (Manila: HQ Div of the Philippines, 1902), 6-10.

¹⁰³ Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 152.

¹⁰⁴ Barbara von Eckardt, What is Cognitive Science? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 33-45; Eckardt attributes the leading research in this field to Stephen Kosslyn whose experimentation in 'imaging' substantiates the value of mental models in acquiring higher levels of cognition.

¹⁰⁵ Pascale CombellesSiegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations (Washington: national Defense University, 1998), 17-22.

¹⁰⁶ Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 49-58 provides an extremely good idea of goal-setting technique in systems theory.

¹⁰⁷ It is preferred that one use this Jominian term, even though the lines of operations referred to are not geographic. Thinking in terms of time, as opposed to space, is fundamental to stability operations cognition. For traditional idea of decisive points and lines of operations see: Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1996), 85.

¹⁰⁸ The employment of military forces on non-combat oriented lines of operations is currently done in Bosnia. IFOR and SFOR became actively involved in all aspects of the GFAP early in the implementation process. See: Larry Wentz, ed. Lesson From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 30.

¹⁰⁹ The scope of this paper precludes detailed description of the mechanics of general systems theory. Critical to this understanding is knowledge of how to maintain an equilibrium between military and non-military functions. Using models of negative and positive feedback mechanisms commanders can more easily see the importance of coordination of joint assets to avoid friction. For a good description see; Draper L. Kauffman, Jr., Systems One: An Introduction to Systems Thinking (St. Paul: Future Systems, Inc, 1980), 4-6.

¹¹⁰ The IPTF in Bosnia are an excellent example. see; Wentz, ed. Lesson From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, 139.

¹¹¹ International crime organizations and criminal dictators are destabilizing nations and regions. Their existence and influence are 'trans-jurisdictional' and 'transnational', highlighting the inadequacies of using military means to deal with them, see; J.F. Holden-Rodes and Peter Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder", in Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict, ed. by Graham H. Turbiville (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1995), 9 and 13. The author's experience in the Balkans 1993, 1995 and 1997 have given some insight into the power of organized crime in local politics there. The key politicians in many areas are the local organized crime bosses. They are often holding positions as deputy mayor or civil servant – positions where they may centralize power behind an official, but impotent, leader

¹¹² Frank Kitson, Low intensity Operations (London: Faber & Faber, 1974), 71, and 79. See also; John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 62, and 119.

¹¹³ Siegel, Target Bosnia, 94.

¹¹⁴ This is currently a point of contention between American and British approaches to information operations in Bosnia. The British are adamant that information operations should be tailored to meet local needs. The American position is that information operations and products must be centrally controlled. See Wentz, Lessons from Bosnia, 182-184. This monograph advocates the British approach because it is more responsive to counter-propaganda. Local stability forces quite easily find themselves victims to local press if they are without means of rapid and widespread media counter-attack. This is amplified in; Siegel, Target Bosnia, 92 -105 and 173.

¹¹⁵ Siegel, Target Bosnia, 98, 112

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 149.

¹¹⁷ Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), 284.

¹¹⁸ The essence of 'combined arms warfare' is that different arms and services work in concert with each other on the battlefield in order to have the "strengths of one system...compensate for the weaknesses of others." See; Johnatan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Ft Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), 2.

¹¹⁹ Canadian experience in the area of low level negotiations is an excellent example, see Despatches Vol. 3, No 1, Vol 3 No 2 (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Publication, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1997).

¹²⁰ Bell, Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, throughout the circulars Bell demonstrates knowledge of every conceivable aspect of life in Batangas, and expects his subordinates to acquire similar local knowledge.

¹²¹ Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 91.

¹²² Richard Simpkin, Race to The Swift: Thought on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 37, 93-115. Akin to Sun Tzu's 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' forces, see; Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans. by Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 147.

¹²³ Carl von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 358.

¹²⁴ John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 64, 67-68.

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